post script posted at The Phora
Consciousness and Thought
This distinction, which has not been consistently elaborated, much less incorporated into a systematic philosophy (until now), is the key to the lock. I have just funished an initial exposition, if any are interested.
As to the worthy comments above:
1. "soul", "mind" are composit S* (sign-uses) -- not terms required or sustained by objective self observation.
Their use in textual communication depends on what the hoary tokens elicit from the audience, which is to say, on what they associate through mythic texture ("Does the soul leave the body at death, like it does in dreams?" -- this questin is the product of confusing consciousness and thought.) Wittgenstein saw they were not descriptive, referential terms, but, lacking the distinction between text and token, became philosophically anecdotal after the Tractatus. Super-sensitive homosexual that he was, I regret to have to say he turned Jew on us -- after crushing Father Russell's Theory of Logical Types, as Sons are wont to do. But this theory is exactly what needs reconstructing, or needs using in reconstruction of the hierarchy of actual S*, stratified into types of conscious content.
2. It is accurate to say no real advance in even conceiving "the mind body problem" has been made since Russell, Wittgenstein, Ayer, Carnap, and G. BERGMANN ("Metaphysics of Logical Positivism") decisively clarified cognitive (true-false) communication. Bergmann is important for providings an Ideal Language reconstruction of the act of awareness as a particular. But, while texted awareness IS occurrent ("now", for me), with content of the upper triad of sign-uses (S*7-6-5) (explaiuned elsewhere) wholly contained in a given present, it is thought, only, that is particulate (through the tokens used to express it), wheres consciousness is the containing continuity of throught at all levels. The Ideal Language philosophy of positivism, which aimed to set out the formal framework for a unified language of science in an intersubjective object-language, could never accomodate psychology because terms of self-reference under consciousness are not intersubjectively verifiable.
Bergmann's "acts of awareness" analysis reconstructs a form for predicating on something "mental" that refers to something outsode itself, as thought does in consciousness, but the entire project is unsquare --like applying logical analysis to "God"-use. (cf ludicrous attempts to formulate it as a name, which Descartes still does, along with talking about "substances"; both show stunted psychosemiotic awareness.)
__________________
Everything is two
This distinction, which has not been consistently elaborated, much less incorporated into a systematic philosophy (until now), is the key to the lock. I have just funished an initial exposition, if any are interested.
As to the worthy comments above:
1. "soul", "mind" are composit S* (sign-uses) -- not terms required or sustained by objective self observation.
Their use in textual communication depends on what the hoary tokens elicit from the audience, which is to say, on what they associate through mythic texture ("Does the soul leave the body at death, like it does in dreams?" -- this questin is the product of confusing consciousness and thought.) Wittgenstein saw they were not descriptive, referential terms, but, lacking the distinction between text and token, became philosophically anecdotal after the Tractatus. Super-sensitive homosexual that he was, I regret to have to say he turned Jew on us -- after crushing Father Russell's Theory of Logical Types, as Sons are wont to do. But this theory is exactly what needs reconstructing, or needs using in reconstruction of the hierarchy of actual S*, stratified into types of conscious content.
2. It is accurate to say no real advance in even conceiving "the mind body problem" has been made since Russell, Wittgenstein, Ayer, Carnap, and G. BERGMANN ("Metaphysics of Logical Positivism") decisively clarified cognitive (true-false) communication. Bergmann is important for providings an Ideal Language reconstruction of the act of awareness as a particular. But, while texted awareness IS occurrent ("now", for me), with content of the upper triad of sign-uses (S*7-6-5) (explaiuned elsewhere) wholly contained in a given present, it is thought, only, that is particulate (through the tokens used to express it), wheres consciousness is the containing continuity of throught at all levels. The Ideal Language philosophy of positivism, which aimed to set out the formal framework for a unified language of science in an intersubjective object-language, could never accomodate psychology because terms of self-reference under consciousness are not intersubjectively verifiable.
Bergmann's "acts of awareness" analysis reconstructs a form for predicating on something "mental" that refers to something outsode itself, as thought does in consciousness, but the entire project is unsquare --like applying logical analysis to "God"-use. (cf ludicrous attempts to formulate it as a name, which Descartes still does, along with talking about "substances"; both show stunted psychosemiotic awareness.)
__________________
Everything is two
posted by Sid Thomas | 9:46 PM
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