IS-OUGHT and The Other
IS-OUGHT and THE OTHER
From David Hume
“I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds fro some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establish the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of all sudden I am surpised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. this change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ˜tis necessary that it should be observ’d and explain’d: and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor as perceiv’d by reason. “ A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part 1, Section 1, p. 469-470
Hume’s passage communicates a distinction that can be observed in the use of signs—a distinction between two different things words are used for, two different jobs they do, in speaking and writing, according to the way they are linked (“copulated”).
ONE: to inform, or convey information.
This is the fact-stating “IS” use.
In written English, the word “IS” itself is a sign used to connect two other signs typically flanking it on the left, and right; so that “ S* is S* “ exemplifies the form of what is called “a sentence”. “Is” and “sentence” are thus secondary words, presupposing other words having a prior, or primary use (with respect to a given case: signs-of-signs make a hierarchy, illustrated by ““IS” is a word.” Is a true sentence. The theory of logical types, as advanced by Bertrand Russell (or some functional equivalent), establishing an asymmetrical order in this hierarchy, is required to prevent paradoxes and contradictions arising from signs improperly ‘doubling’ back on themselves and each other, as in “the predicate of all predicates is not a predicate of itself”.
The origin of the meaning of “IS” – what it is used to do – lies not in written, but spoken language, however. Writing merely transcribes sounds into shapes, in corresponding sequences. In spoken language, the flanking signs occur ‘before and after”; a temporal series. When the signs of spoken language – typically sounds; but communication with the deaf by ‘signing’ is also performed sequentially -- are transcribed into writing, the time-sequence is mirrored in the special one. There must be a one-one correlation of elements of each, Ludwig Wittgenstein pointed out, in order for this to occur. The act of scanning a written sequence left-to-right, in reading, repeats the time-order in speaking, but it does something else as well. It brings the totality, as a unit in communication, into a single wholly contained representation, or ‘thought’. The signs in the spatial sequence perceived simultaneously provides a unique – but repeatable – content wholly contained in conscious experience. The ‘indivisible unity” of thought(s) was argued by Descartes and others to establish the immateriality of mind.
The mind must be regarded as, in fact, separate and distinct from any tokenized content, verbal or written, because it is what must be appealed to in order to settle disputes over equivocation and ambiguity of text. “What is the intent here?” cannot be answered by seeing and hearing words (as sensory particulars). Only by clarifying the intent, which goes to the user’s consciousness. The ‘text’ of sign-use is the wholly contained thought, repeatable by ‘fungible’ tokens (different languages, alternate spellings, etc.). The text of S* (let the asterisk convey actual use of sign-token, S, in a context of successful communication between two or more persons) is to its empirical token as the (a) mind is to its body. As the ‘anatomical preparation’ (Freud), is required to, first, receive the verbal/written S* as stimuli; then, second, translate it -- in a yet-to-be-determined manner -- into text; … so the person, as a totality – perceiving, speaking, interacting with others, with conscious self-awareness, and thought, – is entirely dependent on their body for all communicated experience whatsoever. Perhaps it may be objected that thoughts may ‘materialize’ in the mind from an unknown, non-perceptual source (‘voices’, ‘channeling’, ‘revelation’). Very well; it is a phenomenon now well understood through mind/brain interaction (stimuli reaching the brain from neurons terminating on peripheral or internal organs that go over into hallucination or delusion by malfunction of the anatomical preparation). If thoughts ‘came through’ with significant factual information about the world the person experiences through their body, but not from any stimulation of the body, the case would be different. (You can say you “visit the Elysean Fields,” but unless you can bring back usable tokens, it doesn’t count; the verification must lie outside the wholly contained experience.)
Clarification of use of “Is” in sentences according to their intended logical implications has brought these:
1. bare assertion --- grammatical conjunction; can be used to illustrate (communicate) non-sense (“A green idea is under the walk”)
2. predication -- assertion that what is represented by the left-hand S* is characterized by what is represented by the right-hand S*
Types: a. adjectival -- predication of a quality; e.g. “this is round” (holding up a penny).
b. nominative – predication of a classifying noun; e.g., “Socrates is human”.
3. class membership – assertion that an individual is a member of a class
“Socrates is a man”
4. Class inclusion – assertion that one class is included or excluded from another, in whole or part (the propositions of Aristotelian syllogism: All A is B, No A is B; Some A is B, Some A is not-B”. These were the essential units of logic throughout the history of philosophy until the 20th centure, and still survive as useful devices for expressing inference in Boolean algebra (drawing class relationships on two overlapping circles).
5. Analysis – formal: assertion that the right-hand sign stands for what the left-hand sign consists of (“A bachelor is an unmarried male”)
--material: assertion of a constituent assessment, e.g., a chemical break down (“Water is H2O”)
6. identity – formal: assertion that what the right and left hand S* stand for are one and the same thing: “x is x” (or “x=x”), where ‘x’ is a variable for any S*.
--material: assertion that a thing designated by one expression is identical with the thing designated by another expression (GWBush is the 43rd president of the U.S.).
7. (Truncated use) Bare existence. Assertion that something exists. (“God is”; “the ocean is”.
TWO - To link two terms subjectively – by means of the mental attitude invoked by, or in, bringing them together.
Ought:
Ought to be -- token of desire, authorizing texts of wish fulfillment.
(“States ought to be deal justly with citizens”) (Value)
Ought to do – token of constraint on will-in-acting, authorizing judgments of blame and punishment according to what is done. (Morality)
Tbc.
From David Hume
“I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds fro some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establish the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of all sudden I am surpised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. this change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ˜tis necessary that it should be observ’d and explain’d: and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor as perceiv’d by reason. “ A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part 1, Section 1, p. 469-470
Hume’s passage communicates a distinction that can be observed in the use of signs—a distinction between two different things words are used for, two different jobs they do, in speaking and writing, according to the way they are linked (“copulated”).
ONE: to inform, or convey information.
This is the fact-stating “IS” use.
In written English, the word “IS” itself is a sign used to connect two other signs typically flanking it on the left, and right; so that “ S* is S* “ exemplifies the form of what is called “a sentence”. “Is” and “sentence” are thus secondary words, presupposing other words having a prior, or primary use (with respect to a given case: signs-of-signs make a hierarchy, illustrated by ““IS” is a word.” Is a true sentence. The theory of logical types, as advanced by Bertrand Russell (or some functional equivalent), establishing an asymmetrical order in this hierarchy, is required to prevent paradoxes and contradictions arising from signs improperly ‘doubling’ back on themselves and each other, as in “the predicate of all predicates is not a predicate of itself”.
The origin of the meaning of “IS” – what it is used to do – lies not in written, but spoken language, however. Writing merely transcribes sounds into shapes, in corresponding sequences. In spoken language, the flanking signs occur ‘before and after”; a temporal series. When the signs of spoken language – typically sounds; but communication with the deaf by ‘signing’ is also performed sequentially -- are transcribed into writing, the time-sequence is mirrored in the special one. There must be a one-one correlation of elements of each, Ludwig Wittgenstein pointed out, in order for this to occur. The act of scanning a written sequence left-to-right, in reading, repeats the time-order in speaking, but it does something else as well. It brings the totality, as a unit in communication, into a single wholly contained representation, or ‘thought’. The signs in the spatial sequence perceived simultaneously provides a unique – but repeatable – content wholly contained in conscious experience. The ‘indivisible unity” of thought(s) was argued by Descartes and others to establish the immateriality of mind.
The mind must be regarded as, in fact, separate and distinct from any tokenized content, verbal or written, because it is what must be appealed to in order to settle disputes over equivocation and ambiguity of text. “What is the intent here?” cannot be answered by seeing and hearing words (as sensory particulars). Only by clarifying the intent, which goes to the user’s consciousness. The ‘text’ of sign-use is the wholly contained thought, repeatable by ‘fungible’ tokens (different languages, alternate spellings, etc.). The text of S* (let the asterisk convey actual use of sign-token, S, in a context of successful communication between two or more persons) is to its empirical token as the (a) mind is to its body. As the ‘anatomical preparation’ (Freud), is required to, first, receive the verbal/written S* as stimuli; then, second, translate it -- in a yet-to-be-determined manner -- into text; … so the person, as a totality – perceiving, speaking, interacting with others, with conscious self-awareness, and thought, – is entirely dependent on their body for all communicated experience whatsoever. Perhaps it may be objected that thoughts may ‘materialize’ in the mind from an unknown, non-perceptual source (‘voices’, ‘channeling’, ‘revelation’). Very well; it is a phenomenon now well understood through mind/brain interaction (stimuli reaching the brain from neurons terminating on peripheral or internal organs that go over into hallucination or delusion by malfunction of the anatomical preparation). If thoughts ‘came through’ with significant factual information about the world the person experiences through their body, but not from any stimulation of the body, the case would be different. (You can say you “visit the Elysean Fields,” but unless you can bring back usable tokens, it doesn’t count; the verification must lie outside the wholly contained experience.)
Clarification of use of “Is” in sentences according to their intended logical implications has brought these:
1. bare assertion --- grammatical conjunction; can be used to illustrate (communicate) non-sense (“A green idea is under the walk”)
2. predication -- assertion that what is represented by the left-hand S* is characterized by what is represented by the right-hand S*
Types: a. adjectival -- predication of a quality; e.g. “this is round” (holding up a penny).
b. nominative – predication of a classifying noun; e.g., “Socrates is human”.
3. class membership – assertion that an individual is a member of a class
“Socrates is a man”
4. Class inclusion – assertion that one class is included or excluded from another, in whole or part (the propositions of Aristotelian syllogism: All A is B, No A is B; Some A is B, Some A is not-B”. These were the essential units of logic throughout the history of philosophy until the 20th centure, and still survive as useful devices for expressing inference in Boolean algebra (drawing class relationships on two overlapping circles).
5. Analysis – formal: assertion that the right-hand sign stands for what the left-hand sign consists of (“A bachelor is an unmarried male”)
--material: assertion of a constituent assessment, e.g., a chemical break down (“Water is H2O”)
6. identity – formal: assertion that what the right and left hand S* stand for are one and the same thing: “x is x” (or “x=x”), where ‘x’ is a variable for any S*.
--material: assertion that a thing designated by one expression is identical with the thing designated by another expression (GWBush is the 43rd president of the U.S.).
7. (Truncated use) Bare existence. Assertion that something exists. (“God is”; “the ocean is”.
TWO - To link two terms subjectively – by means of the mental attitude invoked by, or in, bringing them together.
Ought:
Ought to be -- token of desire, authorizing texts of wish fulfillment.
(“States ought to be deal justly with citizens”) (Value)
Ought to do – token of constraint on will-in-acting, authorizing judgments of blame and punishment according to what is done. (Morality)
Tbc.
posted by Sid Thomas | 11:38 PM
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